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JURISDICTION
This matter is an appeal of a final order of the Utah Labor Commission issued on
January 14, 2008. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(8)(2003).
ISSUES ON REVIEW
1.

Whether the Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
his work accident is the legal cause of his ongoing neck complaints.

2.

Whether the Labor Commission's review of the record to evaluate legal
causation improperly reconsidered medical causation.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 34A-2-401, Utah Code Annotated, provides in
relevant part:
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104, who is
injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident
was not purposely self-inflicted shall be paid:
(a) compensation for the loss sustained on account of
injury or death;
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for:
(I) medical, nurse and hospital services;
(ii) medicines . . .

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner (hereinafter "Verburg") filed an application for hearing seeking an
award of workers' compensation benefits related to two alleged industrial accidents, on
March 24, 2004 and again on June 17, 2004, during his employment with Ogden City
Police Department. (R. Vol. 2 at 1-2).
A hearing was scheduled before the Labor Commission on April 26, 2005. The
hearing was continued to June 7, 2005 on motion of Respondents. (R. Vol. 2 at 26-30).
An Administrative Law Judge of the Labor Commission (hereinafter "ALJ") held
a hearing in this matter on June 7, 2005. At the hearing, Verburg withdrew his claim
for an accident on March 24, 2004, but proceeded to present evidence related to the
alleged industrial accident of June 17, 2004. (R. Vol. 3).
On June 17, 2004, Verburg struck the right side of his head while getting into a
patrol car to remove his belongings at the end of his shift. (R. Vol. 3 at pp. 11-13, 25).
The parties agreed that Verburg had a preexisting condition that contributed to
the injury of June 17, 2004 and that there was a medical causal connection between
the June 17, 2004 incident and Verburg's complaints of increased neck pain thereafter.
(R. Vol. 3 at 6, 7). However, the parties disputed whether the evidence was sufficient to
satisfy the legal causation requirement of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986)1.

]

R. Vol. 3 at 7. Petitioner's argument regarding legal causation is somewhat
unclear. On the one hand, he seems to argue that the higher legal causation
requirement should not apply to accidents which are an "unexpected occurrence."
However, petitioner never raised such an argument before the commission. The dispute
herein is whether the exertions of Verburg's accident satisfy the higher legal causation
standard under Allen.
2

The ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on October
6, 2005. She concluded the evidence showed that Verburg struck his head with
sufficient force to satisfy the higher legal causation standard under Allen. (R. Vol. 1, pp.
37-43)
Respondents (hereinafter "Ogden City") filed a Motion for Review on October 27,
2005, alleging that the ALJ's legal causation analysis was incorrect and her conclusions
were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 44-53).
The Labor Commissioner reviewed the record in this matter and concluded that
the evidence did not show the exertion involved in Verburg's accident was enough to
prove legal causation. The commission denied Verburg's claim. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 59-62).
Verburg filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 5, 2007. (R. pp. 6370). The commission denied Verburg's Motion for Reconsideration on January 14,
2008(R. pp. 80-82).
Verburg filed a Petition for Review in this Court on February 13, 2008.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Verburg worked for Ogden City as a Community Service Officer. (R. Vol. 3 at
10).

2.

Verburg has a medical history of "headaches, most likely muskuloskeletal," since
March 1997 (R. Vol. 2 at 87); and cervical disc disease with surgical work up on
December 2, 2002 (R. Vol. 2, at 22-24, 232). He received a cervical fusion at
C5-6 and C6-7 on December 10, 2002 by Dr. Bryson Smith. (R. Vol 2. at 25-27).
He also has a history of opiate dependency and detoxification treated at Ogden
Regional Medical Center in 2000. (R. Vol. 2 at 46).
3

3.

On January 8, 2004, Verburg saw Dr. James Rhee for evaluation of "persistent
upper back pain," aggravated by exercise, that had become worse over the past
two months. (R. Vol. 2 at 195-196). He was treated with pain medications,
epidural steroid injections, which did not improve his symptoms, and physical
therapy, which he did not attend. (R. Vol. 2 at 196-198). He also escalated his
analgesics beyond Dr. Rhee's recommendations. Accordingly, Dr. Rhee
discharged Verburg from his care. (R. Vol. 2 at 198). A cervical myelogram on
April 5, 2004 showed multilevel degenerative disc disease. (R. Vol. 2 at 43-44).

4.

Dr. Brent Felix performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion to treat
Verburg's persistent neck pain on April 19, 2004. (R. Vol. 2 at 54-56).

5.

On May 4, 2004, Dr. Felix indicated that he would release Verburg to return to
work at light duty on May 19, 2004. In follow up on June 8, 2004, Verburg
requested that Dr. Felix release him to regular duty with the understanding that
he would continue sedentary work duties, and "would not be required to go into
the field and be at risk of trauma to his neck." Zanaflex, a muscle relaxant, was
prescribed at that visit. Verburg's physician refilled his Lortab prescription on
June 17, 2004 by telephone. (R. Vol. 2 at 57).

6.

Verburg testified that he hit the right side of his head on the door frame of his
patrol car at the end of his shift on June 17, 2004. He was not knocked
unconscious, but reported that his vision "went black for a couple of seconds."
(R. Vol. 3 at 11-12). The accident report indicates the accident occurred at 5:45
p.m. (R. Vol. 1 at 11). Verburg explained that he was facing the front of the
vehicle, went to sit down in the seat and "as I went down, that's when I hit." (R.
4

Vol. 3 at 25). He did not twist. Id- at 26. Verburg testified that his symptoms
$e<ja<A about au Uou<; ot two afte<; the K\cldec\t- !4- at 13,24. Vecbunj testified
that he had pain in the center of his neck and pain radiating into the shoulders.
He said was concerned that he might have disrupted his fusion, id. at 16, 24.
Verburg testified that he went to McKay Dee Hospital after he reported the
incident to his sergeant, id- at 17. Verburg testified that he provided all the
details of the accident to the medical providers and testified that he told the
medical providers that his vision went black when he hit his head. id. at 22.
7.

The medical records indicate that Verburg's first post-accident medical visit
occurred on June 29, 2004. Id. At 59. The record reflects that on an unknown
date, likely after June 17, 2004 and before June 29, 2004, he called Dr. Felix to
request "stronger med b/c he hit head." The request for stronger medications
was denied, id.

8.

Verburg saw Dr. Felix on June 29, 2004 "because he hit his head on the garage
door and hit his head getting into his car." X-rays showed no problems or
disruption of the fusion. 30 Percocet were prescribed. (R. Vol. 2 at 59).

9.

Verburg saw Physician's Assistant Schelling at Ogden Clinic on July 2, 2004.
The history indicates that Verburg hit the right side of his head on a car. The
examination note indicates "+ local tenderness at the left scapular reqion muscle.
Radiates to L postferior] occipital region along the scap/traps." Impressions were
chronic neck pain, DJD and muscle spasms. The PA offered muscle relaxants,
put Verburg declined them. "Pt only wanted pain meds." (R. Vol. 2 at 138-139).
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10.

Verburg reported the June 17 incident to his employer on July 5, 2004 and was
sent to the Emergency Room. The Employers' First Report of Injury indicates
that the head bumping accident occurred on June 17, 2004 at 5:45 p.m. (R. Vol.
1 at 11).

11.

Verburg went to the Emergency Room at McKay-Dee Hospital on July 5, 2004
with a complaint of neck pain. "He states that two weeks ago he hit his head
getting in his police car. Since that time he has had pain in his (sic) back of his
neck as well as on the right side of his head." He was diffusely tender at the
posterior cervical spine. X-rays of the neck revealed no acute findings, but did
show signs of effusion. He was diagnosed with a cervical strain, given a
prescription for 20 Percocet and advised to use ice, stretching and exercise. (R.
Vol. 2 at 1-3).

12.

Verburg returned to the McKay Dee Hospital Emergency Room on July 9, 2004
with complaints of ongoing neck pain. The history indicates that Verburg "reinjured his neck while climbing into his squad car approximately two weeks ago.
He struck his head. . . he is out of the Percocet and needs additional pain
medications." On examination, "His posterior cervical spine is not significantly
tender to palpitation in the midline, rather laterally in the musculature." He was
diagnosed with an acute exacerbation of chronic neck pain and given another
prescription for Percocet. (R. Vol. 2 at 5-6).

13.

Verburg returned to Dr. Felix on July 13, 2004. He reported that "he was doing
quite well until he hit his head on a car and now he has similar pain to what he
has had previously prior to surgery. He localizes the pain mostly down in the
6

lower cervical area near the C-7-T-1 area. He has been taking Percocet, four
per day, these are the 10 mg tablets."

Dr. Felix concluded that Verburg simply

continued to have pain, and recommended physical therapy and pain
management. (R. Vol. 2 at 59).
Verburg saw FNP Creager at Nowcare of Ogden on July 31, 2004. He reported
a history of hitting his head on a patrol car in June and now his pain is worse
than before his first fusion. The pain was described as a "deep burn on the left
side of his neck that is worse than before." He complained of an "overall
headache that he has had for quite some time," with nausea. An MRI was
scheduled and 24 Percocet given. (R. Vol. 2 at 85-86).
On August 10, 2004, Verburg returned to see Dr. Felix. The doctor indicated that
Verburg continued to localize his pain to the C7-T1 area. X-rays showed
instrumentation in good position with no evidence of loosening or migration.
However, Verburg continued to complain of pain. Dr. Felix recommended pain
management, physical therapy and a cervical MRI scan. Percocet was refilled.
(R. Vol. 2 at 61). Dr. Felix completed a Physician's First Report of Injury, but the
questions regarding medical causation were left blank, id- at 63.
On August 13, 2004, Verburg saw Dr. Matthew Pingree for evaluation of his neck
pain. Dr. Pingree noted a history of an anterior cervical fusion in April 2004. "He
apparently reports that he had no pain for 7 weeks after surgery and was not
taking any pain medications. On the 17th of June 2004 he hit his head on his
patrol car at work and ever since has had a return of bilateral neck pain now
instead of just on the left side. He did not lose consciousness however he did go
7

blank for one second and this has gotten progressively worse. He went to the
emergency room that day and on one other occasion. He reports he has pain
100% of the time." (R. Vol. 2 at 179-180). The x-rays performed on August 26,
2004 were reviewed and compared to prior films. They were read to show no
misalignment or evidence of instability. (R. Vol. 2 at 53).
There is a consensus among the physicians who have examined Verburg that
the increase in Verburg's complaints of neck pain is medically causally related to
the incident of June 17, 2004. R. at 13, 232. However, the parties dispute
whether the exertions of the employment satisfied the higher legal causation
requirement under Allen.
The Administrative Law Judge correctly noted that the question to be addressed
was whether the petitioner "carried his burden of proving legal causation." She
reasoned that:
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the
direct force Petitioner experienced moving from a standing
position to sitting position while propelling his body with such
a force that when he struck his head his vision went black,
was not a typical exertion experienced by men and women
in modern non-employment life. While getting into a motor
vehicle is typical of modern non-employment life, such
exertion does not typically involve the combination of factors
presented here. Specifically, the continuous movement of
Petitioner's body and weight added more force to the impact
of Petitioner's head and neck on the door jam which was
unusual or extraordinary and satisfies the requirement of
legal causation. This extra exertion served to offset the
preexisting condition of Petitioner as the likely cause of the
injury. Moreover, how Petitioner felt before and after the
(sic) June 17, 2004, evidences the degree of force exerted
by Petitioner. Following surgery in April 2004, Petitioner felt
better than before the surgery and was happy with the result.
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However, following June 17, 2004, Petitioner experienced
significantly increased pain in his cervical spine.
Finally, in concluding that that (sic) facts of Petitioner's injury
satisfied the higher legal causation standard, it is the duty of
the Labor Commission to construe the Workers'
Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee
coverage when statutory terms reasonably admit of such a
construction.
(R. Vol. 1 at 41).
Ogden City filed a Motion for Review of the ALJ's order, asserting that the ALJ
incorrectly analyzed the evidence regarding legal causation and incorrectly
applied a liberal construction standard to her analysis of the facts and the law.
Ogden City asserted that the preponderance of the evidence did not support the
ALJ's conclusion that the accident of June 17, 2004 was a compensable
industrial accident. (R. Vol. 1 at 44-53).
The Commission granted Ogden City's Motion for Review and denied Verburg's
claim for lack of legal causation. Upon review of the available evidence, the
commission concluded that the accident of June 17, 2004 was "a relatively
routine event in which Verburg bumped his head while getting into the drivers
seat." The commission was unconvinced that Verburg's testimony that his vision
went black could reasonably be used to show the force of the impact. Although
the commission recognized that there are circumstances in which a head bump
could satisfy the higher legal causation standard, the facts presented in this case
do not establish that the exertion involved in Verburg's accident was unusual or
extraordinary. The commission reversed the ALJ's decision and denied
Verburg's claim. (R. Vol. 1 at 59-62).
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21.

Verburg filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Labor Commission. He
asserted that the commission's Order misapplied the "Allen test" and improperly
reconsidered medical causation. (R. Vol. 1 at 63-70).

22.

The commission issued an Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on
January 14, 2008. In sum, the commission concluded that the accident event
itself was a relatively routine event in which Verburg hit his head as he was
sliding into the drivers seat. The commission concluded that Verburg's vision
going black was an atypical response to a typical exertion, rather than
persuasive evidence that the force involved in the accident was greater than
typical non-employment life. (R. Vol. 1 at 80-81)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Judicial review of final agency actions is governed by the Utah Administrative

Procedures Act." Color Country Mqmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, p. 16, 38
P.3d 969. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) provides that the appellate courts may
grant relief to a party who has been "substantially prejudiced" by an agency that "has
erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Whether the Labor Commission has
erroneously applied the Allen legal causation requirement, however, is a mixed
question of law and fact that is reviewed for reasonableness and rationality. Acosta v.
Labor Comm'n e t a L 2002 UT App 67 , P. 11, 44 P.3d 819, 822 (internal citations
omitted).
The correction of error standard of review does not apply to this case. The
appellate Court applies a correction of error standard to review the commission's
interpretation of the law. See Acosta, 2002 UT App 67 P 10. However, in this matter,

10

Verburg requests that the Court of Appeals review the commission's application of the
law to the facts.
Petitioner asserts that the rule of liberal construction of the Workers'
Compensation Act subjects Labor Commission decisions that deny benefits to a
"heightened degree of oversight" on appeal, citing Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor
Comm'n.,153 P.3d 179 (Utah 2007). However, Salt Lake City Corp. addressed the
applicability of the coming and going rule to a police officer who was involved in a traffic
accident while she was driving her police car home. While such "heightened oversight"
is appropriate to determine whether to bring an injured worker under the protection of
the Worker's Compensation Act, such heightened scrutiny should not apply in this
matter, which is a challenge to the commission's evaluation of the evidence regarding
legal causation.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The petitioner had a long history of neck and shoulder pain for which he
underwent cervical fusion surgeries in 2002 and again in 2004. His complaints of neck
pain originally began without any inciting event. He had headaches and pain into his
shoulders and arms that were refractory to conservative medical care.
He was surgically fused at C5-6 and C6-7 in December 2002. He underwent a
second cervical fusion surgery at C4-5, on April 19, 2004. He was released to return to
work at full duty on June 8, 2004. Shortly after his return to work, he hit his head on the
doorframe of his patrol car. The evidence shows that he was simply getting into his
vehicle and coincidental^ hit his head on the car.

11

Verburg testified that his vision went black for a couple of seconds, but there
was no immediate pain. None of the contemporaneous medical reports indicate that
Verburg's vision "went black" after he bumped his head as he testified at the hearing.
The vision symptom is first mentioned in the medical records in August 2004. Verburg
was not knocked out or knocked down as a result of the incident. He was not
responding to an emergency.
Verburg did not seek medical care or take time off work related to increased
neck pain until 15 days later. He waited 18 days to report the incident to his employer
as a workers' compensation accident. The medical records show that Verburg
continued to receive prescriptions for muscle relaxants and narcotic pain medicines,
after he returned to work, although he testified that he was pain free up until the June
17, 2004 accident.
There is no dispute that there is a medical causal connection between the June
17 accident and the complaints of increased neck pain. However, because Verburg
had a preexisting contributing condition, Utah law requires that he prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the incident on June 17, 2004 legally caused his
injury. To meet his burden, Verburg "must show that his employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of
his condition."

Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). The

burden of proof to show a causal connection is by a preponderance of the evidence.
Allen at 23, citing Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979).
Petitioner asks this Court to construe the Allen decision to not apply to unusual
reactions to usual events. He likens his bump on the head while getting into his patrol
12

car to a traffic accident, a trip and fall down stairs, or a slip and fall to the ground.
These types of accidents are easily distinguished from Verburg's minor accident.
Verburg essentially argues that if a fall down stairs is compensable, then a bump
on the head must also be compensable. However, the higher legal causation
requirement is intended to distinguish between those accidents that coincidentally occur
at work and those in which the employment contributes more to cause the injury than
"typical" non-employment activities. When one compares the examples of "typical"
non-employment activities provided in Allen, such as lifting a small child to chest height,
lifting and carrying luggage for travel and changing a flat tire on an automobile to
Verburg's bump on the head, it is easy to see that his incidental bump on the head did
not involve the type of exertion, or force to the body, needed to satisfy the legal
causation requirement.
Verburg claims that because his vision went black for a moment, the bump to
his head was a more significant contributor to his injury than his pre-existing, weakened
condition. This is precisely the type of situation to which the higher legal causation test
is intended to apply. The commission found that the evidence was inconclusive to
show the force of the impact to Verburg's head was more than typically experienced in
everyday life. The commission was not persuaded that Verburg's employment
increased his risk of injury beyond the risk that is typically experienced in everyday,
non-employment life. Rather, the commission concluded that the weight of the
evidence in this matter shows that the incident on June 17, 2004 was typical of the type
of insignificant insult commonly experienced in everyday non-employment life.
Accordingly, Verburg's claim must fail.

13

Verburg argues that because the commission considered that there was no
medical evidence of marks or bruising, as part of the legal causation analysis, that the
commission improperly re-evaluated medical causation. It is appropriate for the
commission to use common sense, life experience, and probability to evaluate the
evidence to determine facts.

The commission reviewed the entire record for evidence

that would tend to support Verburg's claim and concluded that Verburg's complaint of a
brief vision disturbance, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of legal
causation.
Verburg misapprehends the commission's duty to evaluate all of the evidence.
The commission is required to consider all of the evidence presented that is relevant to
the decisions it must make regarding workers' compensation claims. When there is no
objective evidence to show the force of the exertion, the commission must review the
record for evidence to support its findings. The commission simply looked to the
medical records for additional objective evidence to support an award. The absence of
bruising, contusion or even tenderness to palpation on the right side of the head all
support the commission's conclusion that the force of impact was more ordinary than
extraordinary. The commission correctly concluded that the petitioner presented
insufficient evidence to prove legal causation.
ARGUMENT
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
PETITIONER DID NOT PROVE LEGAL CAUSATION BY
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
It is undisputed that Verburg brought a pre-existing weakened condition to work
with him on June 17, 2004. It is undisputed that the event of June 17, 2004 was an
14

"accident" as that term is defined by Utah law2. It is also undisputed that Verburg's preexisting condition, degenerative cervical disc disease for which Verburg had recently
received surgery, medically contributed to his increased complaints of neck pain after
the accident of June 17, 2004. The only dispute between the parties to this appeal is
whether the evidence shows that the head bump on June 17, 2004 involved a force
great enough to satisfy the higher legal causation standard. If legal causation is
proven, Utah law requires Ogden City to pay for all future medical expenses and wage
loss related to Verburg's complaints of ongoing neck pain.
Two elements are necessary to prove an injury by accident in the course and
scope of employment under Utah's workers' compensation system. These are: (1) an
injury by accident; and (2) proof of a causal connection between the injury and the
employee's employment.

In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the two part

causation analysis promoted by Professor Larson's treatise on workers' compensation
law. Allen at 22-23.
In addition to adopting the now familiar two part analysis requiring evidence of
medical and legal causation, the Court also clarified that the "standard to prove causal
connection is preponderance of the evidence." Allen at 23, citing Lipman v. Industrial
Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616,618 (Utah 1979). "To sustain this burden it is not enough to
show a state of facts which is equally consistent with no right of compensation as it is
with such a right. Surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation is not sufficient to justify a

2

An "accident is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the
cause or the result of an injury." Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah
1986).
15

finding in the plaintiffs behalf" Hiqlevv Industrial Common, 285 P 306, 308 (Utah
1930)
The evidence presented in this matter shows that at 5 45 p m on June 17, 2004,
Verburg slid into the seat of his patrol car to retrieve some items As he slid into the
vehicle, he struck the right side of his head above the ear, on the doorframe He was
not knocked unconscious and he was not knocked down He testified at the hearing on
June 7, 2005, that his vision went black for a couple of seconds He reported no
immediate onset of pain, but said that his neck later became stiff and sore
There was no evidence presented at the hearing to show that Verburg was
responding to an emergency situation or moving quickly at the time of the accident
There was no evidence presented to show that the circumstances of Verburg's
employment increased the risk of hitting hit his head or caused him to strike his head
with more force than typically occurs when getting into a car and bumping one's head
in everyday life The evidence does not establish that the blow was forceful
Verburg did not immediately seek medical care or report an industrial accident to
his employer The medical records of Dr Felix on June 29th and July 13th, Ogden Clinic
on July 2nd and McKay-Dee Hospital Emergency Room on July 5th and 9th do not
mention any observed swelling, tenderness or bruising at the site of the impact These
initial medical reports from three different providers do not mention any history that
Verburg's vision "went black" for a couple of seconds These medical reports only show
that Verburg was complaining of increased pain at the back and left side of his neck
after hitting his head

16

The ALJ reasoned that the force of the blow to Verburg's head exceeded the
typical exertions of non-employment life because his vision went black for a moment.
She also reasoned that the combination of his body weight and lateral movement
increased the force of the blow to the side of his head, but failed to offer any rational
explanation or reference to other evidence in the record to support her conclusion3.
On Motion for Review, the Labor Commission was not convinced that Verburg's
"testimony of his vision going dark is a measure of the force of impact," and concluded
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the exertion or force of impact involved
in Verburg's accident was unusual or extraordinary in comparison to typical nonemployment life.
Petitioner argues that there is ample evidence in the record from which the
commission could find legal causation. Although Verburg argues that the significant
force of the impact caused his vision to go black, there is no medical opinion in the
record to support such an assumption. Verburg essentially asserts that a small scrap of
self-serving evidence4 supported by a mere supposition that this evidence reflects a
greater than typical force of the impact, is sufficient to prove legal causation. Even
though the commission accepted Verburg's testimony at face value, the evidence does
not compel the conclusion that Verburg's accident involved an unusual, atypical,

3

As Ogden City pointed out in the Motion for Review, the evidence did not show
that the circumstances of Verburg's employment increased the force of the impact
compared to a similar accident in typical non-employment life.
4

The only evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Verburg's vision
actually did go black for a moment was his testimony and the statements he made to
Dr. Pingree on August 13, 2004. He never reported this "symptom" to the medical
providers he saw immediately after the accident.
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forceful exertion. The evidence does not compel a conclusion that the accident was
significant in any way. Although the evidence might be interpreted to show that Verburg
hit his head with significant force, the evidence might also be interpreted to show, as
the commission found, that Verburg had an abnormal reaction (complaints of
significant pain) to a typical event (a bump on the head). Accordingly, the commission
concluded that the evidence showed that Verburg's "injury" was more likely the result of
his pre-existing condition. In order to prevail before this Court, Verburg must persuade
the Court that the commission's application of the legal causation test is not reasonable
or rational. Verburg has not demonstrated that the commission's interpretation of the
evidence and application of the law to the facts is unreasonable or irrational.
Verburg fails to acknowledge that the type of accident he experienced is a
relatively common occurrence, and usually insignificant. The commission noted that it
is not uncommon for people in typical non-employment life to hit their heads on
doorframes, cabinets, or car trunks, and sustain no significant injury. Although these
types of incidents don't occur everyday, they are nevertheless a common occurrence in
everyday life. There is no frequency requirement to the objective standard applied in
such cases.
Among the examples of typical non-employment life provided in Allen, is
changing a flat tire on an automobile. Although this is a "typical" activity, it rarely occurs
in modern life more than once or twice a year, sometimes even less frequently. This
typical activity is relatively strenuous. This task involves loosening lug nuts; lifting and
carrying a wheel and tire; bending over or kneeling down to place the jack under the
automobile; jacking the car; and tightening lug nuts. If this task is performed on the
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side of the road, it would also involve watching out for errant motorists. This "typical"
activity is actually rather strenuous. It is important that the Allen Court did not cite
examples of typical activities like: sitting on the couch watching TV, or playing video
games. It is clear that the Court intended to set the standard at a reasonable level to
prevent the employer from becoming a general insurer of his employees. As the Court
noted, the purpose of the higher legal causation standard is to "offset the preexisting
condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for
impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at work." Allen at 25.
This Court recently reviewed the purpose of the legal causation requirement in
Acosta v. Labor Commission:.
[A]s stated by Professor Larson, 'the object is to distinguish workconnected collapses from those that are due to normal progression of a
disease." 2 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, LARSON'S WORKER'S
COMPENSATION L A W § 46.03[4], at 46-18 (2001). The underlying purpose
served by making this distinction is to prevent awarding benefits where
there is not "a sufficient causal connection between the disability and the
working conditions." Allen, 729 p.2d at 25.
Acosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67,U 23.
As Justice Zimmerman noted:
The sole question is whether the worker came to the
workplace with a condition that increased his risk of injury. If
he did, and that condition contributed to the injury, then
Allen's higher standard of legal causation comes into play so
as to place that worker on the same footing as one who did
not come to work with a preexisting condition. To rule
otherwise would create the strong likelihood that a worker
who has a preexisting condition and whose virtually
inevitable injury simply happens to occur at work will be able
to foist the cost of that injury on his employer when the
workplace had little to do with causing the injury.
Hollowav v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31, 32 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman,
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J. concurring). Thus it is appropriate that Ogden City not be made Verburg's general
insurer for his non-industrial neck condition.
Verburg argues that because he hit his head and medically exacerbated his neck
pain, he should receive benefits for his pre-existing degenerative neck problems.
However, he has not shown that his work contributed anything to increase his risk of
injury from bumping his head. Rather, he suffered an atypical reaction to a typical
activity. Verburg cites examples of slipping while carrying a garbage can or being
injured when a jack slips while changing a tire and argues that these examples are
similar to the exertions of his accident and would be compensable. However, the
compensability of these examples, like the compensability of Verburg's accident
depends on the totality of the evidence surrounding the accident. The example of
slipping while carrying a trash can would satisfy legal causation only if the trash can
was sufficiently heavy and the other circumstances reveal unusual or extraordinary
exertions. If the employee fell to the ground while carrying the trash can, legal
causation would clearly be satisfied. Similarly, the slipping jack could satisfy the higher
legal causation standard depending on the specific exertions involved in the accident.
If the car falls off the jack and lands on the petitioner, legal causation is met. If the car
falls and the employee jumps out of the way, the analysis is less certain and would
depend on the existence of additional facts to support a finding of causation.
Had Verburg proved that his work contributed something substantial to increase
his risk of injury, the commission would have awarded benefits. However, the evidence
simply did not show that Verburg's head bump was significant. Verburg wasn't knocked
out; he wasn't knocked down; he didn't have immediate pain or dysfunction and he
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didn't seek immediate medical care. In short, he provided no evidence other than his
testimony that his vision briefly went black to show that the stress and strain he
experienced on June 17, 2004 was more than the stress and strain of typical nonemployment life. The commission has the duty to analyze all of the evidence
presented to determine whether the evidence supports the claim. In this case,
petitioner did not provide much evidence for the commission to review to evaluate his
claim. When the evidence can reasonably lead to different conclusions, the
commission is entitled to interpret the evidence as it sees fit, so long as the
commission's interpretation of the evidence is reasonable.
Petitioner confuses the requirement for an "injury by accident" with the
requirement to prove "causation." The commission carefully reviewed the record for
sufficient evidence to show that Verburg's employment provided something substantial
to increase his risk of injury. However, there was only one piece of evidence to support
a finding of increased risk related to the employment; a brief vision disturbance. The
commission was unconvinced that this evidence alone was enough to support an award
of benefits. Given that there was no other evidence to support a finding that the impact
in this matter was in any way greater than a typical, everyday bump on the head, the
commission's decision is supported by the evidence in the record and should not be
disturbed.
II. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY REVIEWED ALL OF THE
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO CORRECTLY APPLY
THE LAW TO THE FACTS
Verburg asserts that the commission should award him benefits because he
sustained an unusually forceful blow to the head while getting into his patrol car after
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work to retrieve his belongings. The only evidence he presented to show the force of
the blow was his testimony that his vision went black for a second. The commission
was unconvinced that Verburg's report of briefly darkened vision supported a
conclusion of an unusually forceful impact. Accordingly, the commission reviewed the
rest of the evidence in the record to determine whether there was any additional
evidence that would support a finding that Verburg's blow to the head was more than a
routine, typical bump to the head. The commission found no additional supportive
evidence and, because the vision symptom offered by Verburg was unpersuasive as to
the force of the head bump, denied Verburg's claim.
Petitioner complains that the commission improperly reconsidered medical
causation because it noted the "absence of any evidence of bruising or other marks
from the impact,5" that would support the conclusion that Verburg sustained more than
a typical head bump on June 17, 2004. This argument is incredible. The burden to
prove medical causation is typically rather low. The claimant merely has to provide a
doctor's report stating that his accident medically caused his injury or medically
aggravated his pre-existing condition. Medical causation is typically based on the
doctor's evaluation of the history of the injury, which is provided by the injured worker
and the doctor's medical knowledge about mechanisms of injury.
Medical causation does not require a showing that the injury was more likely to
have occurred at work than anywhere else. Rather, it is legal causation that is
designed to address that aspect of causation. Legal causation compares the injured

5

R. (Vol. 1)at61.
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worker's specific, workplace exertions to an objective, non-employment life standard, to
determine whether the injury is the result of the pre-existing condition or the
employment related exertion. Given that these two separate causation analyses
address different aspects of the causal relationship, it is appropriate and reasonable
that the commission considered whether the evidence showed that Verburg had bruises
or contusions after the accident. Common life experience tells us that bruises typically
result from a significant impact. The lack of evidence of bruising is simply one factor
that the commission considered to determine legal causation.
The commission explained:
The Commission has reviewed the evidentiary record in this
matter with particular attention to the accident that occurred
as Mr. Verburg was getting into his car. Based on the
evidence, the Commission reaffirms its finding that Mr.
Verburg experienced a relatively routine event in which he
bumped his head as he slid into the driver's seat. The fact
that Mr. Verburg experienced an unusual reaction to that
event-his vision "going black" for a moment-does not
change the nature or force of the impact itself, but is more
reasonably related to Mr. Verburg's preexisting cervical
problems6.
Verburg admits that he did not see a doctor immediately after the accident of
June 17, 2004. He argues that any marks or bruising would likely have decreased or
disappeared by the time he did see a doctor. The fact that Verburg did not see a doctor
immediately or even within a couple of days argues against the blow having been
significant. Verburg recently had fusion surgery. He claims that he was concerned
about a non-union of his fusion. Such concerns would cause many patients to seek

6

R. (Vol. 1)at80.
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immediate medical care. The fact that Verburg did not seek medical attention near the
time of the accident supports the commission's conclusion that the bump was a "typical"
one.
Verburg argues that "none of the medical records reflected any absence of
bruising or other marks and there was no other evidence in the records concerning the
existence or non-existence of such items." Pet. Br. at 29. Verburg asserts that the
commission's conclusion that there was no evidence of bruising is unsupported.
Review of the medical records in this matter clearly shows that none of the medical
providers mentioned the presence of bruising or marks on the right side of Verburg's
head after the June 17, 2004 accident. Further, Verburg did not testify that he suffered
bruises or other marks after the accident. It is reasonable to expect that the medical
providers who saw Verburg looked for evidence of bruising or swelling when he sought
care. Although the Emergency Room physicians who examined Verburg noted that his
neck was tender to palpation and ecchymotic. They mention no symptoms on the side
of his head. Accordingly, the commission's observation that there is no evidence in the
record to show any bruising or other marks is correct. This observation is not an
improper assumption, as Verburg claims, but rather, a correct interpretation of the
evidence presented in this matter.
Similarly, the medical histories recorded by the physicians Verburg saw in June
and July 2004 do not indicate that he ever reported to them that his vision briefly went
black. He saw four different providers after the June 17th incident and none of their
records indicate that he struck his head forcefully against the doorframe; that his vision
"went black;" or that he had any bruising or discoloration as a result of the blow. The
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only evidence Verburg presented to show that the force of the impact on June 17th was
forceful, was his testimony that his vision briefly "went black." There is no medical
opinion in the record to support the conclusion that this vision complaint is medical
evidence of a significant blow to the head. It is Verburg's burden to prove that the
accident legally caused an industrial aggravation of his pre-existing condition; he simply
has not provided sufficient evidence to prove his claim. Although there is no dispute
that there is a medical causal connection between the head bump and Verburg's
reported increase in neck pain, he cannot prevail in this matter without evidence to
prove legal causation.
The Labor Commission and its Administrative Law Judges must use their
common sense and life experience to determine whether the theories of the case
presented by the parties are natural, probable, reasonable, plausible and easy to
believe. The commission may not simply provide "a talismanic incantation" finding that
there was "unusual or extraordinary exertion," as a substitute for careful analysis of the
evidentiary record. See Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1083
(Utah 1986). When the only evidence presented to support a finding of legal causation
is not persuasive and there is no other evidence in the record to reasonably support a
finding of legal causation, the commission should deny the claim. Workers'
compensation is not intended to make the employer a general insurer of its employees.
This is precisely the reason that the Supreme Court adopted the legal causation
requirement.
It is Verburg's burden as the petitioner, to prove legal causation by a
preponderance of the evidence. To prove his case, Verburg must point to some
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convincing, persuasive evidence in the record to prove that his accident is the legal
cause of his injury. Under the circumstances of this case, he needed to provide
evidence that the blow was forceful enough to increase his risk of injury over the risk of
injury he faced in everyday life because of his pre-existing condition. Verburg simply
failed to meet his burden to prove legal causation. Therefore, the commission's
decision in this matter should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The petitioner has the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he was injured by accident in the course and scope of his employment
with respondent. Where, as here, the petitioner brought an element of personal risk of
injury to the workplace, he must show that the exertions of his employment substantially
increased his risk of injury. The evidence presented in this matter showed that Verburg
was simply getting into an automobile and coincidentally bumped the side of his head.
This is exactly the type of incident to which the higher legal causation requirement is
intended to apply to protect employers from becoming general insurers of their
employees.
Therefore, the Labor Commission correctly concluded that the preponderance of
the evidence in the record does not show that the accident of June 17, 2004 involved
exertions sufficient to satisfy the higher legal causation standard under Allen.
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Accordingly, this Court should affirm the order of the Labor Commission which denied
workers' compensation benefits in this matter.
Respectfully submitted this

/

day of June, 2008.
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